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Target Article
 
Arguments Opposing the 
Radicalism of Radical Constructivism
 
Preface
 
The following tract presents an outline
and review of the theses proposed by radical
constructivism. It acknowledges the fact that
radical constructivism must be credited with
the merit of having persistently enhanced
the constructivist discourse. Numerous
analyses of the “radical” constructivists may
expediently be adapted by “moderate” con-
structivists provided that the epistemologi-
cal hypotheses are disregarded. Not every
form of constructivism represents radical
anti-realism and, indeed, this can not plau-
sibly be so, as the following review intends to
demonstrate. For the sake of accuracy, one
can differentiate between a “cognitive con-
structivism” and a “radical constructivism”
(Nüse et al. 1991, p. 1). What may already be
pointed out at this early stage is that the
plausibility of the radical conclusions is
nourished by the fact that, as a contra-posi-
tion, an objectivism and a naïve realism are
constructed. The representatives of radical
constructivism do not, however, limit them-
selves to the relativization of cognition to a
subject, as is the case in critical realism
(Groeben 1995, p. 150); their conclusions
are more far-reaching, which justifies
regarding them as relativists (Fischer 1995,
pp. 21, 28). Also characteristic of this is Ernst
von Glasersfeld’s definition of the “epistemic
solipsism” (Glasersfeld 1987a, p. 404). The
publications of von Glasersfeld are well
suited to exemplifying how far a simple copy
theory can be constructed as a contra-posi-
tion. He confronts perception and cogni-
tion, as “constructive” actions, with their
subsequent conception as “imaging”
actions, and further states: “Instead of an
iconic relation of conformance or reflec-
tance we can apply the relation of matching”
(Glasersfeld 1992a, p. 30). He had already
referred to the “‘iconic’ relation of the con-
formance” to be merely conceptually based
on isomorphism “even though only a rough
convergence is postulated” (Glasersfeld
1992a, p. 18). In the course of this, the defi-
nition of isomorphism is construed very
closely, just as von Glasersfeld is only able to
perceive the definition of the correspon-
dence objectively in terms of truth-theoreti-
cal relevance (Glasersfeld 1995b, p. 37).
Non-trivial copy theories are, however,
indeed thinkable, as is exemplified by Ralf
Nüse. He points out that it is possible to per-
ceive the imaging relation mathematically.
Human perception constructs are subse-
quently (only) 
 
signs
 
 for aspects of the objec-
tive reality. Reality and constructed truth
dispose of different properties, which, how-
ever, “covariate” with each other (Nüse 1995,
p. 178). Isomorphy may subsequently also
relate to the concurrence of structural
changes within two sectors that are indepen-
dent of each other, and it is plausible to state
that the truth constructs comprise informa-
tion relating to the reality. “Just as a fuel indi-
cator provides a statement relating to the fuel
level, without actually being the same, the
phenomenal world subsequently provides a
statement relating to the actual world, with-
out exactly being this actual world.” (Nüse
1995, p. 179)
For this reason, when dealing with radi-
cal constructivism great attention must be
paid to the implications of the assignment of
definitions and the adequacy of conclusions.     
What is presented here as “radical con-
structivism”, is necessarily simplified and
distorted, as there are considerable differ-
ences amongst the authors, who, in addition,
have changed their opinions over the course
of time. This is most significantly expressed
by the fact that the authors Humberto R.
Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, who for-
merly produced theories in a quasi symbiotic
way, have now ceased to cooperate, for which
reason they are forced – for the first time – to
develop truly 
 
auto
 
poietic constructs of the
world.       
On the one hand, radical constructivism
can be regarded as 
 
philosophical 
 
theory of
cognition and it is mainly presented by some
authors as such. On the other hand, it can
also be regarded as an 
 
empirically-founded,
naturalized 
 
cognition theory, which is natu-
rally emphasized in the argumentations of
natural scientists.   
 
Gernot Saalmann 
 
A
 
 University of Freiburg <gernotsaalmann@yahoo.de>
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R Purpose – Examination of the main arguments for radical constructivism and the 
critical arguments put forward against it. R Findings – Although there is no reason to 
doubt the value of constructivism as such, it can be stated that any epistemological 
radicalism lacks plausibility. There is ample evidence that we still can adopt a critical realist 
outlook, even if every part of our world view is a construction. R Implications – We 
should engage ourselves in the development of an anti-metaphysical, non-objectivist 
epistemology. By far the most promising contribution should be a version of pragmatism. 
R Key words – cognitive constructivism, critical realism, epistemology, pragmatism, 
reality, viability.
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The basic assumptions 
of radical constructivism
 
The 
 
radical 
 
constructivists continue to
refer to the long standing 
 
skeptical 
 
argument
that the human being is not able to step out of
his intellectual world in order to compare it
with reality, as this is always already mediated
intellectually. One has “no other access to
everything one observes using one’s cognitive
apparatus, as exactly this one cognitive appa-
ratus” (Glasersfeld 1995b, p. 36). Skeptics
deduct, from the non-ability to know a fact,
the conclusion of its non-existence. For this
reason, radical constructivists follow the basic
assumption that there is no strict relationship
between sensory stimuli and “
 
real
 
ization”
(there would however exist the need for fur-
ther arguments to be able to assume a limita-
tion of cognition ability from the unreliability
of perception, cf. Groeben 1995, p. 154). The
respective reasoning can be found within
neurobiology and the biological systems the-
ory (H. R. Maturana and F. J. Varela). Accord-
ing to this theory, all sensory information is of
the same type: it concerns the processing of
electrical discharges, in the course of which
only the intensity of a stimulus is coded, and
not the cause of the stimulus (Foerster 1992,
p. 58). The “information” is therefore merely
of a “quantitative” and not a “qualitative”
nature (Glasersfeld 1992a, p. 21, footnote 21;
Wendel 1990, p. 187). For the analysis of neu-
ronal stimulation, another entity is required,
namely the brain. The processes prevailing
there must communicate how a “certainty of
the cognitive world in terms of the content” is
created, if the “specifity of the stimulation” is
not supposed to depend on “the quality of
outer reality” (Wendel 1990, p. 188).
 
1
 
 Here,
the theory presenting all living creatures as
autopoietic systems is applied. It is character-
istic of such systems that they, in cycle-similar
and cyclic-causal closed processes, autono-
mously produce all components that they
themselves consist of and subsequently repro-
duce via the production of their components
(Wendel 1990, p. 189).
 
2
 
 This does not apply
to the brain, as it is materially and energeti-
cally dependent on the body and cannot sus-
tain its functions merely through its neuronal
activities. It is therefore merely a “
 
self-referen-
tial
 
” system (Wendel 1990, p. 90), and subse-
quently energetically open but operational
and semantically closed (Knorr-Cetina 1989,
pp. 88f.). Expressed “Luhmann-poietically”:
“on the operational level [there exists] no
contact to the environment, which of course
does not exclude, on the reality levels of phys-
ical nature which are not broken by system
boundaries, that influences pass through”
(Luhmann 1995, p. 24). This means that it
makes a difference whether or not one
assumes the brain to be an organ or a cogni-
tive system. The human being is therefore an
autopoietic creature that disposes of self-ref-
erential cognitive systems, even though they
can naturally not be closed systems. This
implies a 
 
dualism
 
 of body and intellect, and,
as radical constructivism regarded epistemo-
logically, is a form of rationalism,  this version
of constructivism could be assumed to be an
atheistic and naturalized Cartesianism. In
place of the deceiving demon, one is actually
dealing with self-deceptions of the brain, and
the doubt, as such, is no methodical proce-
dure as it derives from a skepticism, but is
insuperable.    
The brain is not only able to assign a
“meaning” to externally caused stimuli con-
ditions, but also to its own conditions (Wen-
del 1990, p. 193). “‘Consciousness’ is a func-
tion of a system capable of recursive
observations” (Knorr-Cetina 1989, p. 89).
According to this assumption, the meanings
of linguistic expressions and ontology repre-
sent nothing but assignments of the more or
less random cognitive processes of the brain.
If, in such a way, the reality is subject-depen-
dent, the traditional differentiation between
subject and object does not apply (Wendel
1990, p. 195; Rusch 1987, p. 218). Therefore,
one does not live 
 
in 
 
the world but 
 
with 
 
one’s
world (Rusch 1987, pp. 53, 218), and this is
important, as the realistic definition of cogni-
tion is replaced by an instrumentalistic one:
the emphasis is directed at the knowledge
regarding the 
 
how, 
 
not the knowledge regard-
ing the 
 
what 
 
(Glasersfeld 1992a, p. 13). The
criterion for knowledge is not “truth” but the
utility for survival (Rusch 1987, p. 203).
This criterion applies on two levels: On
one hand, it refers to the constructs them-
selves. Ernst von Glasersfeld refers to their
“viability”, if they are “not destructed by expe-
rience” and if they “survive under the restric-
tive conditions of an incognizable world”
(Glasersfeld 1987b, p. 136; 1992a, p. 19). On
the other hand, it refers to the whole organ-
ism. The knowledge constructs merely serve
the one purpose, to maintain the autopoiesis.
If applied consistently, “cognition is [...] the
realization of autopoiesis of the living system”,
and consequently, the following is equally
applicable: “For a living system, life stands for
cognition.” (Maturana 1987, pp. 100f.) For
this reason, “cognition” is primarily tailored
to the options of action for the organism
(Wendel 1990, p. 202). Epistemologically, this
results in a 
 
pragmatic falsificationism
 
: a theory
may indeed not be correct in a realistic sense,
but if it leads to failure, the reaction is to
change it. However, unlike in “correspon-
dence-theoretical falsificationism”, it is not
assumed that new versions of the theory will
become increasingly more truthful (Knorr-
Cetina 1989, p. 90).
In the event of attempts to constitute a
radical constructivism, phenomena of per-
ception deceptions are of great significance
(in particular for von Foerster). For Nüse et al.
it rightly does not seem to be plausible “that
the existence of perception deceptions reveals
the actual nature of perception” (Nüse et al.
1991, p. 152). In their opinion, perception
deceptions represent “side-effects of the
highly specialized construction of the sense
organs. Seen from this perspective, 
 
the
appearance of
 
 perception deceptions not only
makes sense, but, in addition, it is also possi-
ble to explain 
 
why 
 
they appear. In contrast, a
radical constructivist framework theory,
which assumes that ‘the experiential reality is
exclusively a product of a self-organized
structure development’, is not able to clarify
these two issues satisfactorily. Within radical
constructivism, it is neither possible to clarify
why the sense organs are constructed as they
are, nor is it possible to trace why deceptions
should appear in the first place. [...] If the
stimulus patterns, out of which the system
produces structures, merely represent ‘unspe-
cific stimuli’, there would subsequently not
really exist the slightest reason for the system
to perceive certain stimulus patterns as stable
and others as instable (equivocal). [...] Exactly
for the very reason of the existence of percep-
tion deceptions it is not possible to assume
that the world is not recognizable, but rather
the contrary. However, it is at least only possi-
ble to satisfyingly explain the existence of per-
ception deceptions if one assumes that organ-
isms are capable of recognizing the world”
(Nüse et al. 1991, pp. 158f., italics in the orig-
inal text).     
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The fundamental basis of radical con-
structivism seems to imply a certain ambigu-
ity. On the one hand, it assumes a total inde-
pendence from reality during the
construction of reality, and on the other hand,
it instrumentally refers to it, in the course of
which, however, a realistic interpretation of
the knowledge constructs is not supposed to
be permitted. As an explanation for this, the
concept of “structural coupling” is utilized.
This comprises the spatio-temporal align-
ment of the “condition changes of the organ-
ism with the recurrent condition changes of
the medium”, in the course of which the
organism remains autopoietic (Maturana
1985, p. 144). The interactions between the
entity and environment form “reciprocal per-
turbations. It is characteristic of these interac-
tions that the structure of the environment
only 
 
triggers
 
 structural changes in the auto-
poietic entities, they do therefore neither
determine nor direct in any way, which also
applies vice versa.” (Maturana & Varela 1987,
p. 85, italics in the original text)
 
  
 
 
Even if the processing of the perturbations
is merely determined by the systems, this does
not 
 
exclude 
 
that the structural changes are
performed at the ratio of isomorphism as this
is implied above in Nüse’s argumentation.
Insofar, the reality constructs are indeed capa-
ble of “imaging” reality.      
The existence of an objective reality is
assumed by radical constructivism as well
(von Glasersfeld refers to the “unrecognizable
world”, Luhmann to the “reality level in phys-
ical form”, see citations above), and it must
indeed do so, because if it did not, the whole
issue would imply that a seemingly real com-
plete word would be simulated for everyone.
This however, would in turn imply that the
knowledge of its constructive nature would be
completely 
 
useless. 
 
It would accord more to an
instrumentalism, to assume a realism. 
Radical constructivism therefore does not
deny the 
 
existence 
 
of an outside world (Rusch
1987, p. 205; Glasersfeld 1995b, p. 42) with
which the cognitive system is energetically
connected; it does however deny that “knowl-
edge” of this outside world should be
regarded as 
 
cognition. 
 
The perception of an
independent world, which is recognizable as
such, is supposed to merely represent a func-
tion useful for survival (Wendel 1990, p. 201;
Knorr-Cetina 1989, p. 89). What is consid-
ered to be progress within reality perception
by a realistic metaphysics, merely represents
the “optimizations of the methods applied to
realize our autopoiesis” (Rusch 1987, p. 220).
Regardless of this, it is not possible that
the construction of the reality is performed
on a merely random basis. Even though it is
principally possible that identical stimuli
conditions are allocated different significance
by neurons depending on how they are linked
(Wendel 1990, p. 192), certain allocations of
significance are, however, preset by the ana-
tomically predetermined “basic wiring” of the
brain (ibid. pp. 196f.). Consequently, the
neuronal processes, which originate from the
same sense organs, are always interpreted in
the same way (Roth 1995, p. 52).
 
Review of the theses
 
Now that the basic statements of radical
constructivism have been presented, several
objections will subsequently be discussed in
the same order. 
Firstly, it is necessary to point out again
that the 
 
skeptical conclusion 
 
is exaggerated.
The undisputed fact that it is impossible to
“step out” of one’s cognitions does not, by
itself, suffice to assume their insufficiency. It
is merely never possible to 
 
know
 
 how appro-
priate human cognition actually is. To reach a
final decision in this issue, only the plausibil-
ity of the arguments is decisive. In any case,
Nüse et al. quite rightly state: “to draw the
conclusion, out of the arbitrariness and the
subject dependency of the 
 
type
 
 of cognition
and categorization, that the perceived and
categorized matters do not exist, would repre-
sent a confusion of concept and categorized
matter, of percept and perceived object”
(Nüse et al. 1991, p. 150, original text in ital-
ics). The conclusion that every cognition rep-
resents an interpretation does not, as such,
contain any statement in regard to the 
 
quality
 
of the interpretation. A principal doubt must
be well founded. The rejection of realism, in
any case, goes too far and also cannot be con-
sistently maintained by representatives of
radical constructivism. Although Luhmann
dismissed the perception-critical question,
“how is cognition possible, 
 
even though
 
 it
does not dispose of any other access, indepen-
dent from itself, to reality except itself” (Luh-
mann 1988, pp. 8f), in favor of the new guid-
ing principle “cognition is only possible in the
first place, 
 
because 
 
it has no other access to
reality except itself”, he declares that episte-
mology “reflects the uncertainty of cognition
and provides respective reasons” (Luhmann
1987, p. 59). The mentioning of “uncer-
tainty” presupposes a realistic paradigm in
which a comparison of cognitive constructs
and primary data (constructs of the second
and first order) is possible.  
Regarding the 
 
neurophysiological argu-
ments
 
, it appears either that a great part is too
simplified or that the implications generated
by the presented facts are not recognized. In
the individual neurons, only the actual inten-
sity of the stimulus is indeed coded, but the
brain also receives further “reports” – the
duration of a stimulus, the increase and
decrease of the stimulation intensity and the
local distribution of the stimulation intensity
– because several neurons are always stimu-
lated at the same time. What subsequently
reaches the brain is not the individual stimu-
lus, but always a whole pattern. The stimula-
tions are therefore not completely without
any order, but they dispose of a 
 
structure
 
. For
this reason, it is indeed plausible to state the
assumption that the stimulations also com-
prise an 
 
informational input
 
 from the outside
world, even though this is still far from being
the 
 
complete information
 
, which is con-
structed in the brain. This has also been
detected by Gerhard Roth, for which reason
he speaks of “primary information”, “raw
data” and the “implied information” con-
tained in the raw data (Roth 1995, pp. 52, 53,
58f.). His conclusions are therefore adopted
here, and with these, a 
 
critical realism
 
 can at
least be established just as well as a radical
constructivism: “No cognition, 
 
as such
 
, dis-
poses of an order or specific form. The raw
data that derives from the sense-data is over-
lapping and ambiguous, merely 
 
implicitly
informative
 
. It must be configured according
to 
 
internal criteria
 
, i.e. their information must
be transformed to 
 
explicit
 
 information in the
light of former experience. For this reason,
cognition is never an image of sense-data, but
always a construct.” (Roth 1995, p. 60, in ital-
ics in original text) Therefore, it is surely inap-
propriate to state “the flow of physical
impulses, which reach the sense organs of the
human being [could] principally be struc-
tured 
 
by an infinite number of methods
 
 and
subsequently experienced” (Vaassen 1994,
p. 91, italics by the author). 
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Although the concept of 
 
autopoiesis 
 
is
surely very expedient, one should however
refrain from regarding it as absolute. Living
systems do not 
 
re
 
produce themselves, they
 
produce
 
 themselves, however, everything they
produce for reproduction is no longer part of
 
their 
 
system, but part of 
 
the next generation
 
.
Even though it is possible to speak of the oper-
ational closeness of autopoietic systems, one
should not equate this with autonomy. All
systems must be energetically open and the
intake of the energy is conducted via the
absorption of molecules of varying size. These
are of a certain chemical structure, which can
only be degraded through a few certain fixed
methods. Due to this, the internal operational
structure is partially determined from the
outside.
 
 
 
In this regard, the following point
should not be given too much emphasis but
should, however, be taken into consideration:
if the systems are necessarily open for mole-
cules, would it consequently be that remote to
assume that they are also open for (primary)
information?  
One false estimate in regard to the perfor-
mances of cognitive systems is also generated
by the fact that one has merely applied 
 
one
 
model perception (“autopoiesis”) without
differentiation between all different types of
creatures (Plato: the tadpole and Protagoras).
What should be given much more attention is
the fact that human beings do not initially dis-
pose of operational structures, but must first
develop these by themselves. 
 
At the beginning
of life, the human brain constructs itself. 
 
To
clarify this using an old image: it is not per-
ceptions, but 
 
the possibility to make specific
perceptions in the first place, 
 
that is written
onto the empty blackboard. For this purpose,
stimuli are actively and repeatedly gathered in
order to produce fixed links in the brain.
These neuronal links are developed in the first
few months of life and are almost impossible
to change at a later stage. This strongly implies
the conclusion that, in the course of this link-
ing process, the construction is not conducted
freely, but in realistic “interaction” with the
outside world. Otherwise, the capability of
the 
 
organism
 
 to survive (viability) would not
be warranted later. Radical constructivism
merely considers the genesis of knowledge
constructs, 
 
not the genesis of the cognizing sub-
ject
 
. Even if one does not wish to cling to old
perceptions of the subject, one is, however,
forced to make a statement in regard to the
relation of consciousness and bio-chemical
processes, or to the ego and its relation to the
cognitive constructs. What is it that perceives
itself to be different from the perceptions,
considered by this very self to be its own?     
Even if one regards the organism and the
brain as representing two different systems, it
is still 
 
not possible
 
 to assume a 
 
dualism. 
 
After
all, the objectives of cognition – autopoiesis
and survival – both refer to the body and are
not exclusively limited to the cognitive sys-
tem. The brain, as such, serves no other pur-
pose; it serves the autopoiesis of the body as a
whole. The only option to ensure this is the
close coupling of the sensory and motor sys-
tem. The significance that actions have for the
development of the primary links has already
been indicated above. Even later, the brain is
able to activate motor changes to its construct
of the world in order to gain a different per-
spective or feedback (Nüse 1995, p. 189).
Only the “correlation of action, together with
the 
 
change 
 
of the sensory perception con-
nected herewith, enables the construction of
coherent and stable perceptions in the first
place” (Foerster 1992, pp. 58f., in italics in the
original text). This coherence between the
action and perception is indeed emphasized
by the representatives of radical constructiv-
ism. Maturana equates life and cognition
(1987, pp. 100f.) and Varela states: “Cogni-
tion and action, the motor and sensory sys-
tem, are linked to each other as emergent,
interactive-selective patterns”. He therefore
also refers to the “embodiment” of cognition
(Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1992, pp. 225,
205). The equation of life and cognition is an
expressive formula but logically unfounded
in two respects: 1. If the cognitive system is
not able to sustain itself (energetically), but is
semantically closed at the same time, cogni-
tion 
 
cannot 
 
be equivalent to life. 2. For the
very reason the brain is able to assign meaning
autonomously, this goes 
 
beyond
 
 mere self-
preservation and life-support.
Radical constructivists advocate a form of
pragmatism but, due to their skeptical
assumption, its realistic interpretation is
rejected. The statement that cognitive con-
structs could merely “fit”, but not “match”
with the world, only represents an argument
against an 
 
objectivism
 
, but not against a 
 
criti-
cal realism
 
. It accords with the old cognition-
critical comprehension that knowledge con-
structs can only be falsified but not verified. A
good example of how cognitions and practi-
cal actions interactively complement each
other is the three-dimensional vision. One
has the impression that two bodies running
parallel to each other are converging. This
impression changes, however, if one
approaches them, and can additionally be
corrected by measuring their distance from
each other at different points. In spite of this,
however, the optical and mathematical con-
struct remain standing 
 
side by side 
 
on an equal
footing. One version of pragmatism, where
sensory-motor constructs are deemed to be
real 
 
matters-of-fact
 
, is the genetic structural-
ism of Jean Piaget, which was primarily
assumed by several of the radical constructiv-
ists.      
Also in regard to the relation of cognition
and action and the 
 
criteria of usefulness
 
, it is
possible to express objections. If “true” con-
structed knowledge is evaluated in terms of its
usefulness to secure the life-supporting reli-
ability of action, the question must be raised
of what this would exactly look like in situa-
tions where action is required. As it is not pos-
sible to assume that the situations (in partic-
ular critical situations) are purely constructed
on a fictitious basis (this would only obstruct
the autopoiesis and would be a waste of
energy), their constructs must, however, if
they have been mastered and the knowledge
has subsequently been proven to be “true”,
also have some correspondence with reality.
In other words: a real situation is constructed
by the self-referential 
 
cognitive system
 
 in such
a manner that the 
 
organism
 
 is able to handle it
and ensure its autopoiesis. But this is only
warranted, if the constructed reality approxi-
mately corresponds with actual reality. The
statement of the radical constructivists that
this conclusion would not be justified is itself
not justifiable by any means. In fact, it repre-
sents an epistemological assumption as much
as the realistic assumption. Even if von Gla-
sersfeld is right in assuming that one never
perceives everything but always selects, there
is an error in reasoning contained herein if
one states that, in the respective context of the
action, only that which “enables to act suc-
cessfully” (Glasersfeld 1992a, p. 22) is of rele-
vance. For one perceives a situation 
 
before 
 
one
acts, whereby this perception often includes
the realization that many options to act are
open (including inappropriate ones or wrong
ones, respectively such that could lead to
17
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death). Only a realistic construct of the world
allows that the situative and interest-oriented
selected action does not interfere with the
autopoiesis or even renders the same to be
impossible. Two issues connected to this
could not yet be clarified by the representa-
tives of radical constructivism: 1. How is the
brain, as a closed system, supposed to be
aware of its organism’s options to act? 2.
 
 
 
Not
only are organisms or cognitive constructs
affected, but also 
 
human individuals
 
, who also
select options to act which rule out the possi-
bility of autopoiesis, e.g. war, suicide and self-
sacrificing altruism. This illustrates the inad-
equacy of the biologistic idea of man. 
It was pointed out above that the repre-
sentatives of radical constructivism do indeed
acknowledge the existence of the objective
reality, because autopoietic systems are not
autonomous and are forced to absorb matters
and energy. In this case, however, all cognitive
constructs can be regarded as a realistic per-
ception without any logical objections, in
particular if evaluated on the basis of pragma-
tism and instrumentalism.    
With the mere assumption of conditions
close to reality, the principle of the “failure” of
cognitive constructs also makes sense. If the
brain was indeed informationally closed, it
would not be able to establish 
 
what 
 
caused it
to fail. 
 
On what basis 
 
is it supposed to re-con-
struct? If the construction is not intended to
be conducted on a fictive, random basis, in
addition to a second reassessment, the ele-
ments with which the constructs were con-
structed must again be reviewed. For this pur-
pose, one takes a second glance or assumes a
different perspective. This can however only
lead to a reassessment if the triggered pertur-
bations generate new basic information from
which new information is constructed. It was
already mentioned above that the principle of
the 
 
structural coupling
 
 could be seen from this
angle. The perturbations do not merely repre-
sent “malfunctions” but rather 
 
specifically
structured
 
 malfunctions.  
A further indicator for the possibility to
interpret human reality constructs realisti-
cally derives from the 
 
evolutionary theory of
cognition. 
 
If the intellect is indeed a product of
evolution, it must be in alignment to nature,
as only this would allow its specific perfor-
mance, by comprehending nature. The evolu-
tion of the intellect could not have taken place
any other way (as has already been noted by
Freud). It was the prudence of the intellect
that was subject to selection. If one does not
personalize nature in the course of this proce-
dure, this means nothing else but that the
intellect has selected itself during the contest
with nature, in so far as constructs close to
reality have paid off, whereas constructs far
off from reality have lead to death. Neverthe-
less, or exactly for this reason, human cogni-
tion is 
 
species-specific 
 
and 
 
not absolutely realis-
tic
 
 in terms of an objectivism. Nothing,
however, justifies the thesis that it is 
 
absolutely
not 
 
realistic. The comprehension radical con-
structivists have of evolution is totally com-
patible with this opinion (see Glasersfeld
1995b, p. 41). Regardless of this fact, the only
respective statement by them to be found is
the stereotype indication that the adequacy to
reality could never be 
 
established 
 
(ibid. p. 43).
This is not at all necessary, but there are more
plausible arguments that speak for it than
against it. 
A further point to be considered when
dealing with radical constructivism is that
reality can not be constructed alone (solipsis-
tically) by the individual for the simple reason
that the newborn is not able to reach the
objective of autopoiesis by itself. It is initially
totally helpless and dependent for survival on
at first one, and, later, several social psycho-
logical parents. Therefore, the construct of
the world is always conducted 
 
in communica-
tion and interaction with others
 
, and this can-
not be without any consequences for the
interpretation of the world. Von Glasersfeld
also attempts to consider the role of the oth-
ers. He points out the increase of the viability
experienced by models, “which proves itself in
linguistic interaction with others” (Glasers-
feld 1992a, p. 37). If this statement is sup-
posed to make sense, the others must have
been constructed in a realistic manner. If their
construction was only dependent on own
perceptions and interests, these could always
only confirm. To construct them with a tal-
ented and contradicting own will would be
inconsistent with the rest of the own compre-
hension of the world, and would, in addition,
represent a waste of energy, as it would repre-
sent an unnecessary hindrance to autopoiesis.
Subsequently, others disposing of an own will
represent a construct that reflects a reality.     
The fact (for the observers of the observ-
ers) that there are always two reality con-
structs running next to each other, a social
one and one relating to the individual, should
also raise the question, at the very least, of
whether their joint properties as such could in
some way represent the reality. The “inter-
individual conformity of the constructs”,
which can be detected by an observer, can
hardly be sufficiently asserted if one assumes
that these are exclusively dependent on the
subject (Groeben 1995, p. 152). Even if one
was not prepared to regard communication as
an exchange of information, one is forced, as
an observer of a connection of two human
individuals, to provide an explanation for
how they accomplish their coordination. This
can only plausibly be accomplished with the
assumption that the constructs of the individ-
uals somehow realistically relate to the joint
reality. Interactions succeed because the real-
ity constructs of the individuals overlap and
contain reality to a certain extent. 
In this connection, it is necessary to
point out a categorical error in reasoning in
the argumentation of radical constructiv-
ism. It is not possible to write “an epistemol-
ogy of observing” (Foerster 1992, p. 44;
Rusch 1987, p. 199) without also including
the consideration that oneself is “the
observer of the observer”. It is therefore a
false conclusion, if one states that “from the
point of view” of the brain, the brain repre-
sents a closed system. “From the point of
view of the brain, an interior or exterior does
not exist; from the point of view of the brain,
there does not even exist a brain” (Nüse et al.
1991, p. 118). Nüse et al. for this reason refer
to the way of thinking of the radical con-
structivists as “inconsequent change of per-
spective”. Solely the observer of the brain can
decide whether the system is open or closed.
If, in contrast, one assumes the position of
the brain, as the radical constructivists do, it
becomes obvious that it 
 
is impossible
 
 to suf-
ficiently consider the argumentation for the
openness of the brain.
 
3
 
 A further inconsis-
tency is generated by the fact that any con-
clusions drawn from an individual brain (its
closedness) are assumed for all.  
Epistemological conclusions are there-
fore not generated on the level of the brain,
but on the level of the observer (Nüse 1995,
p. 188), and these must then be verified for
plausibility. The following conclusions are
drawn out of the constructiveness of the
human cognition and the fact that they can
only be falsified in practice: (1) Knowledge is
22
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not objective. This conclusion is formally
correct and completely plausible. (2) It is
impossible to always be sure, if knowledge
corresponds with reality. This is also correct.
(3) Knowledge cannot be appropriate to real-
ity. This conclusion is not only not correct
but also not plausible, as the review of the
individual theses should have proven. If one
does not want to make any statement in
regard to reality, one should equally refrain
from making one about realism!     
Instead of asking, in a realistic way of
thinking, whether radical constructivism is
applicable, one could in accordance with its
nature raise questions regarding its usefulness
as a theory. Then it becomes clear that the
same is not greater than the usefulness of crit-
ical realism, if not even less so. Gebhard Rusch
states that the decisive fact is “what new think-
ing and actions we are able to do with the con-
structivist way of thinking and how these new
possibilities to think and act affect the reach-
ability of our objectives and the satisfiability
of our desires” (Rusch 1987, p. 206, in italics
in original text). This statement is acceptable
as long as one actually exclusively thinks con-
structivistic and not radical constructivistic.
One central problem which would totally dis-
appear, if recognition was to be deemed as a
type of invention, would be the issue “how
one was to perceive the interaction between
discovering and inventing within human
thinking” (Groeben 1995, p. 158). 
If one considers that a radical constructiv-
ism can only plausibly arise “if the theses
regarding the self-referential nature of the
neuronal system represent statements in
respect of something real” (Wendel 1990,
p. 212), the criticism of realism becomes
totally implausible. One can hardly realisti-
cally interpret a part of the constructed
human thinking to utilize this to argue that
human knowledge as a whole is not realistic.
Rusch (1987, p. 210) addresses this performa-
tive contradiction as a possible objection
against radical constructivism, but does not
offer any arguments which could challenge it.    
If, in contrast, the statement is made that
the biological theses are also only constructed
instruments, there is no longer any reason for
the subsequent conclusions arguing for radi-
cal constructivism. More so, as this would be
characteristic for the metaphysical approach,
in the course of which the own theory to be
verified (in this case the instrumentalism) is
already presupposed, for which the realists are
always criticized (Wendel 1990, pp. 215f.).
Following Hans J. Wendel, it is possible to
draw the conclusion that radical constructiv-
ism is not able to prevent the establishment of
metaphysical theses, the truth of which is
absolute and not determined relatively to a
certain entity (ibid. p. 218). Ulf Dettmann, in
his examination of radical constructivism,
points out contradictions and inconsistencies
apparent at two central postulates in the rea-
soning. He comes to the conclusion that the,
more or less, clearly expressed main issue was
neither situated in a theory of living systems
(autopoiesis) nor in a naturalized theory of
cognition, but in a relativism based on a meta-
physical value assessment, which is able to
protect the singularity of human life against
the arrogations of universalistic rationality. 
A final point is that the philosophizing
natural scientists are merely repeating old
theses and arguments, which, within the
humanities, were pushed further a long time
ago. Primarily, they rephrase the theory of
Kant: a priori, synthetic assessments (infor-
mation independent of experience) are possi-
ble as these have originated through syntheses
(links) subject to a priori condition (semanti-
cally concluded). However, they only affect
the reality constituted (constructed) by the
transcendental subject (self-referential
brain), and not the reality of matters as such
(the real world). What does prevent the “cog-
nition of reality” is the transcendental aprior-
ity (the absolute self-referentiality).       
Conclusions
Many of the currently reviewed argu-
ments illustrate the significance of an episte-
mological constructivism but not, however,
that it could be a radical constructivism. 
The radical constructivists fail to reason
plausibly why human reality constructs may
not be realistically interpreted. They have yet
to forward the plausible reasoning for why a
pragmatic falsificationism is not supposed to
be able to correspond with reality, even if the
brain is semantically closed to a large extent.
Human cognitive constructs refer to reality,
even though they are not objective and a
metaphysical definition of reality has rightly
been discarded.
The issue of a self-reflective reasoning for
the possibility to understand the foreign has
lead me, in my dissertation, to plead for a crit-
ical realism, which indeed represents a natu-
ralistic constructivism enlightened by sociol-
ogy of knowledge which is not founded
instrumentalistically, but merely pragmatisti-
cally (Saalmann 2005).
Notes
All translations from the German original are
made by the author.
1. Gerhard Roth in particular has dealt with
these questions more deeply (Roth 1995,
pp. 50f.).
2. Those systems are autopoietic, “which
produce and reproduce the parts out of
which they consist, out of those parts out
of which they consist of” (Luhmann 1987,
p. 56).
3. Put differently: “The radical constructivist
principle of the status of an observer
stands in blatant contradiction to the prin-
ciple of closeness of cognitive systems.”
(Fröhlich 2000, p. 242). 
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Gernot Saalmann freely admits that what
he presents “as ‘radical constructivism’ is nec-
essarily simplified and distorted, as there are
considerable differences amongst the
authors, who, in addition, have changed their
opinions in the course of time.” (§3).
This is an ominous opening. Conflating
the critique of the different views of individ-
ual constructivists makes it difficult for indi-
viduals to respond. Given that Saalmann
refers thirty-eight times to Wendel, Mat-
urana/Varela, Rusch, and myself, and only
sixteen times to four other delinquents, it
would have made things easier, if he had dealt
with the four principal ones individually.
I shall try to cope with statements that
seem to refer to my work.
At the end of §1, Saalmann quotes Nüse
(1995, p.179), who claims that a fuel indicator
is a case where “the phenomenal world…pro-
vides a statement relating to the natural
world.” On the surface one might ask: In what
language does the phenomenal world make
the “statement” conveying its “information”?
With regard to the suggested meaning, I
would say that it’s something of a sleight of
hand: the fuel gauge, the number it indicates,
and the level in the fuel tank, are all constructs
that we are happy to use because they turned
out to be viable in our experiential world.
They are just as far from reality as any other
conceptual construct.
I do not think it is correct to say that the
skeptics denied reality (§5). Most of them,
starting with Xenophanes (Fragment 34),
merely professed agnosticism.
With regard to “dualism” (§5), I can only
say that I am not in the least ashamed of
believing that the body and the mind are not
the same. I make a categorical distinction
between the models we create and our reflec-
tive consciousness that constructs them. I do
not believe that we can know – in the sense of
knowing how it functions – the agent that is
aware and enables us to reflect upon experi-
ence.
It is a rather rash conclusion that con-
structivism is not able to clarify the origin of
perceptual illusions (§8). Both Piaget and
Ceccato have sketched operational deriva-
tions of the Müller-Lyer Illusion. Most per-
ception specialists agree that the illusions
arise from how the perceptual apparatus
operates, rather than from its structure, and
as RC is an operationalist theory it has no dif-
ficulty agreeing with this expert opinion. In
any case, illusions are illusory relative to what
my other senses or other people experience: I
do not need a reality to characterize them as
illusions.
Even if it were the case that one cannot
 
exclude
 
 some isomorphism, the statement
that “reality constructs are indeed capable of
‘imaging’ realty” (§10) is hardly a logical con-
clusion. The fact that something cannot be
excluded is not a justification of its existence.
If I say I cannot exclude the existence of evil
spirits, it does not mean that I accept their
existence.
It is misleading to say that “[t]he existence
of an objective reality is assumed by RC”
(§11). Saalmann refuses to accept agnosti-
cism and disregards my repeated assertion
that I stand with Berkeley, who said that we
have no idea what “to exist” is supposed to
mean in a domain beyond our experiential
world. 
Furthermore, I do not think any construc-
tivist has ever claimed “…that the construc-
tion of the reality is performed on a merely
random basis” (§13). In RC it is the experien-
tial viability of constructs that determines
their fate.
At the very beginning of his “Review” (of
the theses he has formulated about construc-
tivism) Saalmann discusses “how appropriate
human cognition actually is” and states that
“only the plausibility of the arguments is deci-
sive” (§15). This reveals the tacit presupposi-
tion from which the writer undertakes his
review. The first two sentences respectively
speak of “appropriate” and “plausibility.”
Both the terms “appropriate” and “plausibil-
ity” require a context in order to become
meaningful. For example the statement, “Per-
haps you should see your doctor,” may be
 
appropriate
 
 if a belly ache has been men-
tioned, but not when you had been talking of
politics or the receding glaciers of the Alps.
Similarly, something may be considered 
 
plau-
sible
 
 in a given set of circumstances, but noth-
ing is plausible in itself. Saalmann tacitly takes
for granted that there is a structured indepen-
dent reality against which the appropriateness
or plausibility of statements can be checked.
I have always maintained that RC, as I see
it, is not derived from neurophysiology or any
other empirical science (§§16, 17). It is of
course encouraging to find that the construc-
tivist model turns out to be compatible with
how neurophysiologists or quantum physi-
cists think about the world, but their findings
cannot give my model a factual solidity
beyond the rational arguments from which it
was developed.
The same goes for Maturana’s model of
autopoiesis. I had the good fortune of being
friends with Maturana for a long time and
have made use of some of his brilliant formu-
lations – for instance that everything said is
said by an observer and that the living organ-
ism proceeds inductively. But there are parts
of his model that I do not accept (e.g., the der-
ivation of consciousness from language). Not
accepting some of his ideas does not mean
that I think they are 
 
wrong
 
. His model is his
model and my model is my model. RC does
not claim to be considered a representation of
ontic reality and therefore “true.” 
RC has never made any bones about the
problem of the subject that generates per-
cepts, concepts, and the structure of the expe-
riential world (§18). It is that mysterious spot
where awareness arises and experience
begins. From my point of view it lies at the
interface of the rational and the domain of the
mystical to which reason has no access.
Saalmann’s remark about Piaget’s struc-
turalism suggests that he is unaware of one of
Piaget’s strongest statements about the con-
struction of concepts, which he made in his
monograph on structuralism: “What
remains, then, are the constructions them-
selves and one cannot see why it should be
unreasonable to think that the ultimate
nature of the real is in continuous construc-
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tion rather than being an accumulation of
accomplished structures” (Piaget 1968, pp.
57–58).
Saalmann seems to think that “useful-
ness” (§21) is the sole criterion of viability.
Consequently he ignores the feedback model
(which is essential to autopoiesis as well as
RC) and the inherent assumption of goals.
Instead he presents the actions of an organism
as though they had to be 
 
caused
 
 by an “actual
reality” rather than by “situations … purely
constructed on a fictitious basis.” Actually, RC
holds that the construction of experiential
reality is “invented,” but not “fictitious” in the
random sense. It is always hemmed in by con-
straints; and experiential reality is just as
unforgiving as any ontic reality you could
imagine. 
The three paragraphs 22–24 seem to be
focused on autopoiesis, but they reveal a flaw
that pertains to all of Saalmann’s arguments.
He seems unwilling to accept the notion of a
reality of which there is no evidence except the
fact that certain ways of acting and/or think-
ing do not succeed. The failures throw no light
on the nature of the obstacle, because they can
be characterized and described only nega-
tively in terms of what does not work. There
is no way of gaining insights about obstacles
from malfunctions, even “specifically struc-
tured malfunctions,” because any specifica-
tion is necessarily in terms abstracted from
experience and therefore has no purchase on
reality. Needless to say, this limitation per-
tains also to the theory of evolution.
In his remarks on communication and
interaction with others (§§25, 26), Saalmann
again ignores that in RC the construction of
“others” is no more ad lib or random than the
edge of the coffee table against which I so
often knock my shin. Consequently, what I
conjecture to be their thinking, intentions,
and meaning is not arbitrary but subject to
continual tests of viability.
The assumption of an “inter-individual
conformity of the constructs” is the starting
point of any consideration of how others
think. Differences, however, are constantly
introduced by the fact that predictions based
on this conformity turn out to be wrong.
There is the peculiar notion that the brain
thinks and has a point of view (§27). I would
say that the brain is a physiologist’s construct
and, on being observed, shows changes of
electrical charge in single neurons. A neurol-
ogist may consider this to be correlated with a
subject’s activity of thinking, but hardly with
a particular thought, let alone a thought refer-
ring to itself. 
The argument of “plausibility” used in the
three paragraphs 28–30 disregards the fact
that the scale of plausibility to which it tacitly
refers is derived from experience, that is, from
the reality we have constructed, not from a
reality presumed to be independent of our
ways of perceiving and conceiving. I remem-
ber explaining this in my review (Glasersfeld
1993a) of the 1991 book written by Nüse et al.
 
Introduction
 
When a person’s understanding of a posi-
tion does not fit the position in substantial
ways, that person’s attempts to logically
demolish that position uniformly fail
 
.
 
 The
real challenge is to find a flaw in radical con-
structivism (RC) from its own initial assump-
tions or some failure of these initial assump-
tions (Dykstra 2007).
 
The adjective “radical”: 
A problem in language
 
Gernot Saalmann uses the term “radical”
in the sense of something “extreme.” For
example, in §1, he contrasts “radical” con-
structivists with “moderate” constructivists.
This adjectival usage of the word “radical” as
“extreme” is a slang usage from the American
sub-culture called “Surfers” which originated
in the late 1950s or early 1960s. “Radical,” in
their slang means: “At or exceeding limits of
control or safety…” (Oxford English Dictio-
nary OED 2007). 
While this meaning of the word “radical”
may be the most frequent use of the word in
U.S. English today, it is not the sense in which
Ernst von Glasersfeld applies the term to cat-
egorize different types of constructivism.
“Radical” as “extreme” occurs in the OED as
the 
 
last
 
 of a long list of usages. All widely
applied well before the existence of the Surfer
culture in the U.S., these other adjectival uses
are variations of the idea: “Going to the root
or origin; touching or acting upon what is
essential and fundamental; thorough” (OED,
Entry 3.a)
 
.
 
 For von Glasersfeld, “radical” dis-
tinguishes the idea of constructivism that he
intends from other notions, whether these
notions are labeled constructivist or not.
From the target article, Saalmann does not
seem to realize that von Glasersfeld is using
the sense of going to the root or origin of and
acting on what he believes is essential or fun-
damental (Glasersfeld 1975, 1985). 
 
The hegemony of the 
realist perspective
 
There are many cases in which authors
criticize RC from realist assumptions about
the nature of human knowledge. Saalmann
seems to belong to them. As von Glasersfeld
has pointed out in many publications (e.g.,
Glasersfeld 1975, 1985, 1991, 1995a), RC starts
with assumptions about the nature of knowl-
edge that are fundamentally different from
those of realism. The initial assumptions of
realism seem to include the notion that the
result of our thinking can be an increasingly
accurate picture or depiction of a mind-inde-
pendent reality (MIR), as expressed by de la
Torre & Zamorano (2001): “[W]e postulate
the objective existence of physical reality that
can be known to our minds…with an ever
growing precision by the subtle play of theory
and experiment.” In RC the corresponding
assumption is that the result of our thinking is
explanations of experience that fit the experi-
ences for which the explanation was con-
structed. Regardless of the degree of fit, such
explanations cannot be claimed to match a
MIR, since they cannot be compared to such a
thing itself.
Hence, the radical constructivist
acknowledges the challenge of the Skeptics
(cf. von Glasersfeld’s 1992). The realist
appears either not to acknowledge it or to be
unaware of it. For Saalmann the challenge is
exaggerated. He concludes that: “It is merely
not possible to know how appropriate human
cognition actually is” (§15). The realist
backed into this corner seems to hang on to a
thread, hoping desperately that somehow,
just as a stopped clock is “correct” twice a day,
the result of our cognition 
 
might
 
 sometime
match an “outside reality.” How would we
know when these two times a day are, if we
have no access to a “real” clock in that “outside
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reality?” The realists’ own initial assumption
appears to mask the challenge of the Skeptics
from them.
In §1, Saalmann has translated a passage
of von Glasersfeld’s that was originally in Ger-
man as: “Instead of an iconic relation of con-
formance or reflectance we can apply the rela-
tion of matching.” There is no example in any
article in English by von Glasersfeld in which
he uses the word “matching” in such a con-
text. Von Glasersfeld goes out of his way to
point out that he uses the word “fit” quite
pointedly and words such as matching are not
consistent with the idea he intends.
 
2
 
 Is it pos-
sible that Saalmann made this error because
he translated the original passage as a realist
and not from an understanding of RC?
Later in the same paragraph, Saalmann
suggests that while MIR and constructed
truth may have different specific properties,
the two are nonetheless covariate with each
other. This is but a restatement of the realist
 
assumption
 
. One need only point out from the
history of explanations that features of
accepted explanations are covariate with sets
of specific experiences with the phenomena.
But when these sets of experiences have
expanded, our explanations are no longer
covariate with them. This disequilibration
between explanation and experience has
moved us to construct new explanations. We
must ask: “How would we know when there
are no more expansions of the set of experi-
ences to be explained?”
Still, the challenge of the Skeptics looms.
How do we know that covariance with expe-
riences also means covariance with an MIR,
itself? In life we never get to see Nüse’s (1995)
fuel tank, how much is in it, or indeed that it
 
is
 
 a fuel tank. We 
 
only
 
 get to see the gauge. This
is the point of the Skeptics’ challenge. Labor-
ing under the hegemony of realism Saalmann
 
assumes
 
 the fuel tank can be known. He
appears to understand neither the nature of
the Skeptics’ challenge nor RC.
In §8, Saalmann refers to “perception
deceptions.” Such a characterization also
exists nowhere in the English writings of von
Glasersfeld. The possibility of a perception
deception depends on the capacity to know a
MIR itself. The capacity to detect a percep-
tion deception is implied by initial assump-
tions of realism. Such a capacity is specifically
not possible from the initial assumptions in
RC. Hence, the concept of perception decep-
tion is not one that makes any sense in RC.
Here again, we have evidence of Saalmann
working from initial assumptions of realism
to formulate his critique rather than the ini-
tial assumptions of RC. By abduction, not
understanding the distinction between these
sets of assumptions means not understand-
ing RC.
RC is accused of ambiguity (§9) and arbi-
trariness (§15). One notices in §11, that Saal-
mann concludes that a consequence of RC is
that “a seemingly real complete world would
be simulated for everyone” and that
“this…would in turn imply that knowledge
of” these worlds “would be completely 
 
use-
less
 
” (emphasis in the original). Add these
three items together and it is not hard at all to
imagine that Saalmann’s notion is that
“knowledge” for a radical constructivist is
some kind of “laissez-faire” entity. It need
have no limits or constraints and still be
acceptable for the radical constructivist. This
is in spite of the explanation given in radical
constructivist literature that our thinking is
about constructing explanations of our expe-
rience. Our explanations are constrained by
the fact that they have to fit our experiences.
Obviously, this all depends on what
might be meant by the word “useless.” As
Saalmann himself points out several times in
his piece, radical constructivists hold that
they construct knowledge to fit experience, to
be viable, and that, in the terms of Maturana
and Varela, this constructed knowledge
enables the maintenance of autopoiesis. But
apparently this does not rise to the standard
of usefulness for Saalmann, although it does
for radical constructivists. One is left to
imagine Saalmann’s standard for usefulness
is the achievement of a true picture of a MIR
or the known approach to such. Nothing else
is good enough because it does not meet real-
ist criteria. Alas, this should come as no sur-
prise since it is clear he is operating from the
initial assumptions of realism and not those
of RC.
 
Conclusions
 
I have pointed out that since no conclu-
sion is logically valid outside of the initial
assumptions on which it is based, we learn
nothing new when realists criticize RC from
realist initial assumptions. Also, given the evi-
dence, Saalmann apparently does not fully
grasp the essence of RC.
All of this is not to say that neither realism
nor RC can be criticized. But the only net
effect of a critique of RC by one who is still
laboring under the hegemony of realism is to
display some of the many ways RC is not com-
mensurate with realism and not understood
by the author of such a critique. To use
another term from current slang in use in the
U.S., 
 
duh!
 
Notes
 
1. From a monologue by Henry V in the play
of the same name by William Shakespeare.
“Once more unto the breach, dear friends,
once more…”
2. Indeed, the passage should be translated as
“Instead of the iconic relation of a perfect
match or mirror image we may posit the
relation of fit.” (von Glasersfeld, personal
communication).
As Maturana (e.g., 1987) has often
reminded us, everything said is said by an
observer. What I say here I say as an observer
and reflects who I am, what I can perceive and
what sense I am prepared to make of that.
Similarly, what Gernot Saalmann says in his
article is said by an observer and reflects who
he is, what he can perceive and what sense he
is prepared to make of that. I describe myself
as an English speaking mathematics educator
with a family background in neuroscience.
Saalmann does not describe himself in his
article but appears to be (to me as an
observer) a German speaking sociologist.
Given that we are different observers it is no
surprise that we make different observations
about radical constructivism. 
One observation we agree on is made in
§3. The authors he quotes would not all agree
to be described as radical constructivist (or
constructivists at all), there are important dif-
ferences between them (for example in what
is being constructed), and there are some sig-
nificant reinterpretations of key ideas (for
example, operational closure, autopoiesis,
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information). I do not have space here to
address all of these issues. Instead I will focus
on the key point of whether an understanding
of cognition can be based on the idea of “real-
ity.”
I would like to focus first on the difference
of language. The authors Saalmann considers
radical constructivists (von Glasersfeld, Mat-
urana, Varela, von Foerster, Luhmann) write
in English, German, Spanish, Italian, and
French (at least). I have read their work in
English and Saalmann has read their work in
German. This means that we have access to
different subsets of the literature, and that
some of what we read passes through transla-
tion. It is entirely possible that radical con-
structivism, as described in German texts, has
the flaws Saalmann sees in it, while in the
English texts these flaws do not exist. But I
doubt it.
A more plausible theory to me is that Saal-
mann’s readings of the texts he reads are
strongly influenced by his emotional attach-
ment to the idea of reality. That his attach-
ment is emotional rather than rational has
been clearly argued by Maturana (1988). And
I see some evidence that it influences Saal-
mann’s reading. In §9 Saalmann quotes a pas-
sage from Maturana and Varela (1987) which
he has translated himself from German to
English. Interestingly, he translates the Ger-
man word “Einheiten” as “entities.”
 
 
 
Now this
is a possible translation, but a revealing one.
In the original Spanish (Maturana & Varela
1984) the word is “unidades,” which the
revised English edition (Maturana & Varela
1992) translates as “unities.” In the words
“unidad,” “unity” and “Einheit” there is an
emphasis on oneness. In Saalmann’s transla-
tion “entity” the emphasis has shifted to exist-
ence. Maturana and Varela are careful writers
and so I suspect that if they chose words (and
their translators chose words) that suggest
oneness rather than existence, they meant to
do so.
Looking carefully at what Maturana and
Varela mean by “unity” reveals some possible
reasons for their choice of words. “A unity
(entity, object) is brought forth by an act of
distinction” (Maturana & Varela 1992 p. 40).
A unity is something perceived by an observer
to be one thing. That they include “entity” as
synonym should not be taken to mean that
“unity” for them means what “entity” does in
a standard dictionary (“something that has a
real existence”). Instead, Maturana and Varela
are taking the opportunity to redefine “entity”
in a way that removes any reference to reality. 
That Saalmann translates “Einheit” as
“entity” tells us something about Saalmann as
an observer. While Maturana and Valera
begin, as cyberneticists do, with an observer
making a distinction, Saalmann begins with
reality. So for him “Einheit” translates as
“entity,” because for him in order for some-
thing to be perceived as a unit it must be real.
As with all observers, he does not do this out
of malice or foolishness, but simply because
his structure, constructed over the history of
humanity and himself, determines that he
must perceive things in that way. As his his-
tory progresses he might learn to perceive
things differently. 
I believe that this belief in reality is a legacy
of the history of humanity and so common to
the structures of many people. It was perhaps
my history as a mathematician, exploring
worlds I know to be inventions but that seem
as real to me as any, that left my structure open
to perceiving all unities as not necessarily real. 
Before I dismiss Saalmann’s observations
on radical constructivism as constructed pri-
marily on the basis of his attachment to the
idea of reality, let me consider one point he
makes where he almost, but not quite, touches
on what I consider a key strength of the work
of Maturana and Varela. In §27 Saalmann
notes that we are all observers, even when we
are observing the observations of others. This
is the insight that forces a radical constructiv-
ist position on us (even if we do not call it
that). If we begin to operate as scientists, sys-
tematically observing what we assume to be
the real world in a reproducible way, we find
ourselves observing the operational closure of
the cognitive systems we observe. For exam-
ple, Evan Thompson (1995) provides a useful
summary of research related to colour vision
and operational closure. Having observed
operational closure to be a general feature of
cognitive systems, we are forced to accept that
it applies also to ourselves. This amounts to a
proof by contradiction that observing reality
is impossible. This was what brought Mat-
urana and Varela to their position (Maturana
& Poerksen 2004). 
Finally, let me try to sum up Saalmann’s
observations in a few sentences. He notes
(§§11, 12, 22) that the radical constructivist
position does not in fact deny the existence of
something outside of the cognition of all indi-
viduals (call it “reality”). He acknowledges
that it is impossible to know how appropriate
human cognition actually is to that reality
(§15, 28), a fact that is central to a radical con-
structivism position. Where he parts com-
pany from radical constructivists is in how he
responds to this necessary uncertainty. A rad-
ical constructivist would suggest that instead
of studying cognition with reference to an
unobservable external world, it would be a
better use of our energies to try to learn about
observers and how they construct the worlds
they observe. In this the radical constructiv-
ism position echoes Wittgenstein’s (1922)
“
 
Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber
muß man schweigen. 
 
[Whereof one cannot
speak, thereof one must be silent.]” Saal-
mann’s position seems to be instead: Upon
which one can know nothing, one must estab-
lish a theory of cognition. And his basis for
this, as noted above, seems to be an emotional
attachment to the idea of reality, against
which one cannot argue rationally. 
 
Lack of systemic wisdom is always punished
Gregory Bateson (1972)
 
I appreciate Saalmann’s recognition that
“there are considerable differences amongst
the authors” and that these “have changed
their opinions in the course of time” (§3); but
given this, what are the consequences for an
outline of the theses of radical constructivism
(RC)? Which approach is best for outlining a
theory of knowing under these hindering
conditions? My suggestion would be to use a
method specifically developed for this kind of
situation and to present it explicitly, or, if it
does not yet exist, to develop one.
In §5, Saalmann writes about sensory
stimuli as a basic assumption of RC. To sup-
port this claim he refers to a few concepts of
the skeptics as well as to the biological systems
theory of Maturana, Varela, and von Foerster.
However, approaching RC with such a spe-
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cific concept requires a clarification of some
important RC basics, which, in my opinion,
are more fundamental and hence should be
considered as primary aspects.
1. First of all, as Maturana (1988, p. 25)
emphasizes, “the most central question
that humanity faces today is the question
of reality.” 
2. The radical difference between RC and
traditional Western epistemology “con-
cerns the relation of knowledge and real-
ity” (Glasersfeld 1984, p. 20). 
3.  RC proposes to refuse and give up the
notion that knowledge can be conceived as
“copy-knowledge” (in analogy to what
Saalmann calls “non-trivial copy”), i.e. as
a picture or representation of reality, and
this proposal applies to any kind of copy
theory. 
4. This refusal is based on many consider-
ations. One of them is the skeptical argu-
ment that the truth of “copy-knowledge”
cannot be assessed because you can never
compare a conceptual (intellectual) copy
of reality – be it a simple or a non-trivial
copy – with the original reality. Another
consideration is Maturana’s argument that
living systems cannot distinguish in expe-
rience between perception and illusion
and as a consequence we, as human beings,
have no way “to make any statement or
claim about objects, entities or relations as
if they existed independently” of us (Mat-
urana 1988, pp. 29–30).
RC proposes to take seriously these pri-
mary aspects and to adopt the notion of
knowledge (§6) as experiential reality, i.e. as
(a system of) experiential coherences “that
the organism builds up in the attempt to order
the, as such, amorphous flow of experience by
establishing repeatable experiences and rela-
tively reliable relations between them” (Gla-
sersfeld 1984, p. 39). What gives validity to
this “autopoietic knowledge”: what makes it
“true”? With this notion of knowledge as
experiential reality, a statement is not vali-
dated through something independent from
us but through coherences within experience
(Maturana 1988, p. 33). Thus truth, in RC, is
coherence within a domain of experience.
One important consequence of such notions
of knowledge and truth is that the relation of
knowledge and reality must be radically
changed. RC changes it from “representation”
to “functional fit” and this has far reaching
consequences: they may seem to threaten
human progress towards the Delphic “know
thyself!,” but in fact they promote it.
§8: A key idea of RC – unfortunately not
addressed by Saalmann – which can promote
that progress is that of mental operations.
Both Silvio Ceccato and Jean Piaget recognize
Bridgman’s insight that the physical world, in
order to be conceptualized, requires mental
operations on the part of the observer. Silvio
Ceccato developed Bridgman’s idea of opera-
tional definitions into a comprehensive sys-
tem of mental operations that were conceived
as constitutive of their contents, thus allowing
the construction of an experiential reality
without the need to 
 
analyze
 
 
 
representations
 
 of
the ontological reality. One important field of
research in this operational approach to mind
was that of the so-called “optical illusions”
(for example Müller-Lyer, and other optical
illusions to which Saalmann refers as “percep-
tion deceptions” in §8) that Ceccato was able
to describe in terms of the mental operations
constituting them (Ceccato 1964, p. 22; Bel-
trame, Berbenni & Galassi 1965).
Regarding the denial of reality (§12), von
Glasersfeld writes “I have never said (nor
would I ever say) that there is 
 
no
 
 ontic world,
but I keep saying that we cannot 
 
know
 
 it. I am
in agreement with Maturana … The crucial
point is that we do not make claims of know-
ing what exists ‘in itself ’; that is, without an
observer or experiencer.” (Glasersfeld 1991, p.
17). This is very different from and for me
much clearer than the denial of “knowledge
regarded as cognition” that Saalmann
attributes to RC.
I contend that the construction of experi-
ential reality is not at all performed on a
“merely random basis” (§13). On the con-
trary, it is performed on the basis of the
attempt and of the ability to establish order
and repeatable experiences which are coher-
ent and fit. Thus it is not surprising that expe-
riential reality will seem rather stable and reli-
able and not at all random.
The neurophysiological arguments sup-
porting RC (§16) may in some cases seem too
simplified, but there is relevant research
where this critique does not apply, such as
research by Walter J. Freeman, for example,
who over the course of a half century has col-
lected and analyzed experimental data on
brain function (particularly the olfactory sys-
tem of rabbits). In one of his last books he
comes to the following conclusion regarding
sensation and perception: “All that brains can
know has been synthesized within them-
selves, in the form of hypotheses about the
world and the outcomes of their own tests of
the hypotheses, success or failure, and the
manner of failure.” (Freeman 2000, p. 90).
Contrary to the author’s rejection of the
significant nature of RC (§33), I consider the
great advantage of RC to be in its inherent
“systemic wisdom” (Bateson 1972, p. 434),
i.e., in its being wise enough to assume an
ecology of mind in its explanations of knowl-
edge as experiential reality. I claim that this
characteristic of RC is based on its very differ-
ent perspective on the relation between
knowledge and reality. Here is where I see the
importance of 
 
radical
 
 constructivism.
Although supportive of many of the posi-
tions taken by constructivists, pragmatists,
and instrumentalists against “metaphysical
realism,” the author Gernot Saalmann
mounts arguments against all epistemologi-
cal radicalisms, in favor of a critical realism.
Ultimately he seeks “development of an anti-
metaphysical, non-objectivist epistemology”
rooted in pragmatism.
It seems on its face that the epistemology
he seeks is incompatible with realism, indeed
that “critical realism” itself is incompatible
with (metaphysical) realism. This all depends
critically on one’s definition of realism, which
is never explicated. The author would have
done well to simply lay out his conception of
critical realism and his desired pragmatic, but
non-instrumentalist, epistemology and then
contrast these with radical constructivism. 
Essentially there are two premises of all
realist thought. The first is that there exists an
external reality that is independent of observa-
tion and interpretation. The second is that the
structure of this reality is absolutely knowable,
such that truth values can be assigned to state-
ments about it. A third, common, belief is that
as observations multiply and hypotheses are
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successively falsified, natural science asymp-
totically approaches the “true” description of
reality. Even if perfectibility is rejected, it
would seem that anti-metaphysical realism is
itself a contradiction in terms. How does one
evaluate the truth-value of a statement about
aspects of “reality” that are independent of
observations, except by invoking metaphysi-
cal, ontological, objectivist assumptions? How
can one even claim that such truth-values exist
if there are no means of evaluating them?
What access, save through our observations,
do we have to this reality? We are led to the
question of whether our measurements can
tell us anything more generally about the
structure of reality beyond those very limited
points of contact. Realists generally say yes,
while pragmatists, operationalists, and con-
structivists generally say no. 
Saalmann distinguishes constructivism
as a psychological theory from radical con-
structivism as a philosophy of knowledge,
embracing the former, while rejecting the lat-
ter. 
Constructivism considers the epistemo-
logical implications of material systems that
construct themselves, thereby determining
the nature of their interactions with external
environments. One can see scientific models,
adaptive, self-constructing devices, and bio-
logical organisms as such systems (Cariani
1989). In these systems, sensory interfaces
(measurement devices, sensors, sensory
organs) interact with environs, changing
internal states contingent upon the joint
properties of sensor/environ. In this manner
linkages are created between changes in the
environment and changes within the internal
states of the self-constructing system. The
self-constructing system has embedded goal-
seeking mechanisms that steer behavior con-
tingent on goals, past history, and sensory
inputs. Sensory interfaces are then con-
structed and/or modified contingent on how
well they perform (predict subsequent mea-
surements, improve performance, permit
survival and reproduction). The system need
not have an internal model of how (or why)
the sensory interface works in order to
improve its performance. The sensory inter-
face determines the nature of the sensor-envi-
ronment interaction, but not the specific out-
comes of measurements that are made with it
(specifying outcomes of measurements
would render them useless as indicators of
states-of-affairs in the external world).
Epistemic autonomy and closure occurs at
the level of choice of observables (or percep-
tual categories), not at the level of individual
measurements. Constructivist systems are
therefore organizationally closed, but infor-
mationally open. Constructivism in its
descriptions of specific, limited epistemic sys-
tems is compatible with realist ontologies or
anti-realist epistemologies, since it says noth-
ing about the ultimate nature of truth or
objective reality.
Radical constructivism generalizes the
situation of the limited, but expansive, self-
constructing observer to knowledge obtained
by communities of observers (i.e. the scien-
tific enterprise, human knowledge). The
“unreasonable effectiveness” of science and
mathematics comes about not because these
automatically generate veridical descriptions
of reality, but because of ratchet-like learning
mechanisms that in effect “put everything to
the test; keep hold of what is good” (Thessal-
onians). New measuring devices and schemas
are constructed, and their performances in
terms of prediction and effective steering of
behavior are tested. Improvements in pre-
dictability and performance are indications
that the selected sets of observables are con-
gruent with the structure of the world and the
task at hand, not that they necessarily mirror
reality. Glasersfeld (1984, p. 21) offers the
parable of finding lock-opening devices: 
“If, on the other hand, we say that some-
thing fits, we have in mind a different rela-
tion [than that of matching]. A key fits if it
opens the lock. The fit describes a capacity
of the key, not of the lock. Thanks to pro-
fessional burglars, we know only too well
that there are many keys that are shaped
quite differently from our own, but which
nevertheless unlock our doors. The meta-
phor is crude, but it serves quite well to
bring into relief the difference I want to
explicate. From the radical constructivist
point view, all of us – scientists, philoso-
phers, laymen, school children, animals,
and indeed, any kind of living organism –
face our environment as a burglar faces a
lock that he has to unlock in order to get at
the loot.” [brackets are mine]
My reading of radical constructivism is
that it accepts the first premise of realism, that
there exists an external world (albeit an ill-
defined one) that is independent of observers,
but denies that we have access to any “objec-
tively true structure of reality.” Thus I think a
radical constructivist can consistently speak
of an external world, and even its hypothetical
structure, without making any claims that the
posited structure is objectively true. I think
radical constructivists can also argue for
“progress” in the form of better predictability
or performance as adaptive, self-constructing
epistemic systems find observables that pro-
vide access to those aspects of the world that
affect performance. 
In the same way that constructivism says
nothing about the status of objective reality,
radical constructivism does not tell us any-
thing specific about how nervous systems
must work, only how we should (or should
not) interpret what they do in absolute
terms. Philosophical arguments based on
current neuroscientific dogmas are notori-
ously prone to error, since there are few neu-
ral systems for which there exists firm under-
standing of how they work, in terms of the
nature of signals and processing mecha-
nisms. For example, assertions made here
related to neural coding, (e.g. that magni-
tudes, but not qualities are encoded in
spikes) are not necessarily true for temporal
codes that are based on spike correlation pat-
terns. Temporal codes can and do furnish the
central nervous system with an iconic,
image-like, internal “re-presentation” of the
proximal stimulus. There is strong evidence
that early auditory representations of pitch
and tonal quality (timbre) are based on such
time codes (Cariani 1999), and such stimu-
lus-locked spike timing patterns exist in
many other sensory modalities as well:
vision, mechanoception, proprioception,
and electroception. The precise natures of
central, adaptively constructed neuronal
assemblies and processing mechanisms that
interpret these iconic, correlation-based
sensory representations are still poorly
understood, thus leaving open the status of
distinctions between sensation, perception,
and cognition and the location of informa-
tional boundaries between organism and
environment.
4
5
6
7
8
 2007, vol. 3, no. 1 13
 
OPEN PEER COMMENTARIES
 
philosophical-epistemological 
 
radical constructivism
 
Gernot Saalmann presents in his paper an
exposition of radical constructivism that
throws together such diverse thinkers as von
Glasersfeld, Maturana, Varela and Luhmann.
He presents their views as something of a uni-
fied front, although actually only Glasersfeld
consistently represents radical constructiv-
ism. In his exhibition and critique of radical
constructivism Saalmann fluctuates between
ontological, epistemological and neurophysi-
ological arguments that have often little bear-
ing on the original ideas of radical construc-
tivism. For example, his discussion on
sensory coding (§16) is hardly relevant to the
basic tenets of radical constructivism. “Sen-
sory coding” entails that there is information
in the environment that can be transmitted to
the organism through senses; a model denied
by radical constructivism (see e.g. Glasersfeld
1995a, pp. 115–116).
Saalmann criticises the anti-realism
implied by radical constructivism and pro-
poses that one should instead embrace criti-
cal realism. While anti-realism is, indeed, a
problematic consequence of radical con-
structivism, Saalmann over-emphasises it.
For example, the very sound claim that the
impossibility to step out of one’s cognitions
does not entail their insufficiency (§15) can
probably be accepted by a constructivist.
Then again, the claims “[the human cogni-
tion] is 
 
absolutely not
 
 realistic” (§24) and
“knowledge cannot be appropriate to real-
ity” (§28) are exaggerated. Radical construc-
tivism is, rather, guilty of a matter-of-fact
withdrawal from explicit ontological dis-
course. It “makes no claim to describe an
independent reality” (Glasersfeld 1995a, p.
1). This does not mean that the idea of non-
verifiability of one’s subjective experience
would entail its being erroneous. It simply
means that, in a rather Wittgensteinian fash-
ion, the constructivist abstains from speak-
ing of that which cannot be spoken about.
Saalmann is, however, right when claim-
ing that the rejection of realism goes too far
(§15). Detachment from ontology is problem-
atic in many senses. Even when no ontology is
explicated, some implicit ontological commit-
ments are made. There must certainly exist
someone who does the construction, and this
someone consists of something that has made
the act of construction possible. The right
approach to this problem is not, however, to
embrace a classical approach to ontology, such
as Saalmann proposes. We should not regress
back to a theory of representations. 
The problem is that the very moment we
commit to a theory of cognitive representation
– to “human cognitive constructs [referring]
to reality” (§34) – we commit to an ontology
of discrete objects with observer-independent
existence. While realism may be “critical,” it
still implies that deep down there exists some
ontological correlation between the “pictures
in the mind” and the “furniture of the world.”
This, however, spells trouble. We should be
able to compare “the furniture” with “the pic-
tures,” but this we simply cannot do (cf. Gla-
sersfeld 2004). Picturing the pictures would,
of course, result in just more pictures. Knowl-
edge is not a picture of the world (Glasersfeld
1995a, p. 14).
As a solution to the problem of anti-real-
ism in constructivism, the commitment to a
theory of cognitive representation is unac-
ceptable. The epistemological problem we face
in cognising the world is not that of whether
our cognitions are right, but the fact that the
variety of viable cognisations is so huge that
there is simply no sensible way of saying which
of our cognisations would be the primary or
“correct” ones. Viability is determined prag-
matically and context-dependently: a viable
cognisation is one that works in a given con-
text of action.
There is, however, some truth to the
notion that viable cognitive constructs must
have some correspondence with reality (§21).
Without accepting the dubious idea of corre-
spondence, we can commit to the construc-
tivist views and yet maintain a degree of real-
ity. We should acknowledge that while the
world is epistemologically inexhaustive, we
can deduce from experience that the world –
whatever it 
 
is
 
 – exhibits certain structurality
which limits our constructions of it. (For a
more detailed account, see, e.g., Järvilehto
2007.)
The construction of the reality is 
 
not
 
 “per-
formed on a merely random basis” (§13). As
Glasersfeld (1990, p. 6) claims: “All action, be
it physical or conceptual, is subject to con-
straints.” The nature of these constraints is
out of our epistemological reach and thus “we
cannot even imagine what the structure of the
real world might be like” (Glasersfeld 1990, p.
3). But the world 
 
exists
 
, in all of its
unknowability, and it is, of course, very much
real. Cognition does not represent the world,
or deliver us pictures thereof, but rather
establishes a functional fit with the world. We
do not need pictures of the world because we
already have the world. This is the sense in
which the constructed reality is indeed very
real. It is, however, problematic, if not impos-
sible, to absolutise any single view on reality
in the ontological sense. Experience teaches
us that pretty much everything can be
approached, perceived and interpreted differ-
ently under different circumstances and by
different living beings.
The reality that constructivism implies is
 
aspectual
 
 as concerns the cognising subject.
Whatever we construct is an aspectual and
functional relation in the world: it is not a pic-
ture or a representation but a particular way
to act in the world according to the needs of
the specific situation. All these aspects 
 
are 
 
the
world, but they simply aren’t the whole world.
Thus Saalmann is right in claiming that
“[i]nteractions succeed because the reality
constructs of the individuals overlap and con-
tain reality to a certain extent” (§26). What is
constructed 
 
of
 
 is the reality, with no other,
“deeper” reality behind this. The actual
resulting construct is, however, always con-
text-dependent, conceptual and practice-
laden, and thus cannot be expressed as an
ontological entity. And that is where the limits
of our cognition and the limits of our knowl-
edge are drawn.
My remarks are based on the view that
mind-and-world structures of subject-inclu-
sive experience (the only available starting-
point for thinking) are created by individual
and collective subjects, and are not derived
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from pre-existing subject-exclusive structures
(zero-derivation (0-D) structuring; see my
papers in CF and the Karl Jaspers Forum). I
will comment on two points. 
 
Reality with and without subjects
 
Gernot Saalman accepts “cognitive con-
structivism,” but objects to the denial of real-
ity by constructivists (§§5, 15, etc.); instead he
advocates a structuring realism: “Human
constructs refer to reality” (§34). 
The word “reality” means a reliable struc-
tured background for thinking and living. But
although the terms “realism” and “reality” are
frequently used in the paper, and are variously
characterized as anti-metaphysical, non-
objectivist, critical, and pragmatic, their
operational (subject-inclusive) meaning
remains unclear. 
Specifically, one would need to know
whether or not Saalmann proposes that real-
ity is mind-independently pre-structured. 
If yes, and it appears at times that Saal-
mann implies objectivity and mind-indepen-
dence (subject-exclusion) for reality, this
amounts to ontic-metaphysical reality in the
traditional sense (although he writes that he
wants an “anti-metaphysics”). And in that
case one would also have to know whether
that implies theistic creation, non-biological
autopoiesis (such as events following the pre-
sumed Big Bang), or something else. 
If not, as may be implied in his endorse-
ment of “cognitive constructivist” principles
(Saalmann also agrees (§15) that it is “impos-
sible to step out of one’s cognition”), “reality”
has an operational meaning which does not
clearly differ from the “working-reality” pro-
posed in 0-D. 
The latter means within-experience
structuring and positing of working-struc-
tures that are not derived from any pre-struc-
tured entities. This is followed by feedback-
testing of their suitability and reliability (via-
bility) during use. Like the more general term
“working metaphysics-ontology,” working-
reality is extrapolated from the “working-
hypothesis” concept of science; it implies no
instrumental reference (§9) to a postulated
mind-independent reality. It also obviates the
need for “anti-metaphysics.” Traditional
objectivity similarly becomes the tool of
“working-objectivity.” 0-D offers no absolute
certainties, but instead a working-reliability
which needs monitoring. This suffices for
dealing with perceptual deceptions (§8) and
action (§21). 
Rather than having to choose between
acceptance and rejection of “reality” (or,
thirdly, an agnostic attitude), 0-D means a
change from a postulated fictitious un-test-
able mind-independently pre-structured
reality to a human mental tool of working-
reality that is structured within individual-
and-collective experience. It can be analyzed
and modified as needed, similarly to other
tools such as language or mathematics. 
 
Objects within subjects
 
Related to this is another difficulty in Saal-
mann’s paper: an apparent random switching
between (a) phenomenological reasoning,
which respects the constructivist emphasis on
primacy of subject-inclusive experience, and
(b) traditional objective reasoning, for
instance neuro-physiological or cybernetic,
which disregards it and thereby causes subjec-
tivity to vanish. The switching presumably
expresses an assumption on the part of Saal-
mann that (a) and (b) are identical. This suf-
fices for time-correlation studies between
variables, but obscures the epistemic rela-
tions. 
Concepts arise and remain within the
mind; so, therefore, do all objective consider-
ations. This confinement of objectivity to the
bubble of individual-and-collective subjective
experience determines the nature of reality
and of the mind-brain relation. But that is
often neglected because it is difficult to work
with, with no external guarantors being pos-
tulated. The (a) = (b) conflation in Saal-
mann’s paper hides it, and so do notions such
as “the mind-brain” or “the embodied mind.”
Workers in psycho-physiology and second-
order cybernetics may also neglect it. Two
(probably not always intended) implications
of this view are that the mentioned conceptual
difficulty is dealt with by denying that it exists,
and that which Jaspers has called “brain-
mythology” is promoted to the standard of
discourse for the mind-brain question. 
“Brains” and “systems” are objects of
thinking, “objects” are structured mental
tools within experience. But experience can-
not become an object of thinking, because its
center cannot become structured, and fur-
thermore, even if completely structured it
would have to be an object within itself, which
is impossible. 
One can observe a cat observing a mouse,
either its behaviour or the relevant brain
functions, or formalize or model the infor-
mational aspect of this activity as an observ-
ing system; but none of these objective func-
tions is what the cat experiences. 
A subject (subject-inclusive experience)
cannot become an object, not even in the
same person. In principle I can observe my
own brain function. I might watch my hip-
pocampal region light up on a screen when I
try to remember something new – this light-
ing-up shows that hippocampal activation
occurs when I do this – but neither the obser-
vation nor the activation are identical with
my memorizing effort. My brain can produce
epileptic seizures, and it works (in a limited
way) when I am under general anaesthesia,
but that is not “me.” I am not neuronal activ-
ity (though I need it for being me) or an
informational system (though I process
information in order to be me); no system is
me. 
Neuro-physiology and cybernetic studies
of observing systems are important areas of
research. But they are (working-)objective in
type; not what the subject being examined
experiences, nor the experience of the subject
doing the analysis and within which the stud-
ies take place. Subjective experience is at the
center of phenomenology and constructiv-
ism, but not of objective studies.
 
Conclusion 
 
If we keep ourselves in the picture, the
role of reality in constructivism, which
emphasizes the centrality of subjective expe-
rience, is clear. Working-reality, and work-
ing-metaphysics-ontology more generally,
are needed as a central part of everyone’s
structuring of experience. To decide between
affirmation and rejection of reality of an
unspecified type, or of absolute metaphysical
reality, is redundant. Working-reality
includes the subjects; it is operational, criti-
cal, and pragmatic. Working-reality and
working-objects are structured by structur-
ing subjects, not by themselves; observations
are not made by themselves, but by observers.
In practice it is not possible to structure the
world continuously at every moment, and
temporary reliance on posited (working-)
agencies is required. However, we should
remain aware that in principle we can and
have to remain the responsible kybernetes. 
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The article argues that radical construc-
tivism is flawed, and should be rejected in
favour of an alternative version of construc-
tivism: critical realism. It is my aim here to
demonstrate that the arguments do not hold,
for at least two reasons: 
[
 
They are directed against a mistaken con-
ception of what radical constructivism is
about. 
[ They are essentially “criticisms from the
outside”: i.e., radical constructivism is
criticised for what it is not, and not for
what it is. 
What is radical constructivism? Saalmann
remarks (rightly) that there are differences in
viewpoint between different authors. My
considerations here are based on arguments
presented by the originator of the theory,
Ernst von Glasersfeld (see, e.g., 1993b, 1995a,
2000); a more detailed discussion is given
elsewhere (Quale 2007). 
One major issue, around which much of
the discussion turns, is that of the existence of
reality, i.e. of an outside world. Here, some-
what confusingly, Saalmann appears to be of
two minds: he acknowledges that radical con-
structivism assumes the existence of an objec-
tive reality (§§11,12, 22, …), but also denies
this (§§5, 8, 15, …). So, let me recapitulate
briefly the radical-constructivist position on
this issue: 
1. The outside world does exist, as a shared
source of our sense perceptions: i.e. indi-
viduals are able to agree that they experi-
ence the same world.
2. However (and this is crucial), it is not pos-
sible for an individual to obtain cognitive
knowledge of it.
Note that these are ontological prefer-
ences: logically, an individual person cannot
exclude solipsism, i.e. the possibility that all
his individual experiences of the outside
world are just hallucinations in his mind. But
this is rejected by the person as being existen-
tially irrelevant for him in the way he conducts
his life. It is in our nature as human beings to
assume that the world that each of us experi-
ences is in fact there, for us to experience and
share. In other words, the outside world is
accessible for us to act on, and to interact with
each other in – indeed, to seriously call this
into question would generally be considered a
sign of mental aberration..! 
The term cognition is defined (see, e.g., the
OED) as: “…knowing, perceiving or conceiv-
ing, as an act or faculty distinct from emotion
or volition.” 
This activity may then lead to cognitive
knowledge, which has the important charac-
teristic of being communicable between indi-
viduals. On the other hand, non-cognitive
knowledge (based on emotion, such as per-
sonal belief or preference) is not thus commu-
nicable, as is explicitly acknowledged by Saal-
mann (§15). And note that this kind of
knowledge is not precluded by radical con-
structivism. The rejection of solipsism on
ontological grounds, as described above, is an
example of non-cognitive knowledge: I can-
not prove that the outside world exists, but I
nevertheless choose to assume it! In fact, any
knowledge of the experiential world (whether
cognitive or not) must be based on whatever
ontological position is adopted by the knower,
i.e. on his conception of how the world is.
Indeed, such an ontological assumption
lies at the base of Saalmann’s critical realism:
he admits that we cannot attain cognitive
knowledge of the outside world (§15), but still
insists (i.e., prefers to believe) that “it must be
there”! And that is, of course, his privilege. He
then goes on to argue that it is possible to
obtain knowledge of this outside world. And
this too is quite permissible, even in radical
constructivism, provided one recognises that
such knowledge is (and must be) non-cogni-
tive. However, it appears that Saalmann does
not accept this provision, cf. his distinction
(§1) between “cognitive” and “radical” con-
structivism.
In his search for knowledge of the outside
world, Saalmann makes extensive use of argu-
ments of plausibility, to support the theory of
critical realism, and to repudiate what he sees
– sometimes mistakenly, as indicated above –
as the content of radical constructivism.
(Indeed the term “plausible,” with derivatives,
appears at least fifteen times in the article.)
However, such arguments can carry little
weight in the academic discourse: what is
plausible to one person is not necessarily
plausible to another! For instance, an isomor-
phy between a construct and its assumed “real
counterpart” is proposed (§1), to boost the
plausibility that the construct provides “true
information” about reality (viz. the fuel indi-
cator example). But this can readily (and, to
my mind, just as plausibly) be expressed
within the epistemic framework of radical
constructivism as expressing viability of the
construct in the knowledge of the individual,
with no need to invoke any real counterpart.
In any case, knowledge based on arguments of
plausibility is highly subjective, and hence
non-cognitive. 
To conclude: radical constructivism fea-
tures a epistemic relativism, in which a propo-
sition of cognitive knowledge cannot be
objectively true in itself, but can only be true
relative to some subjectively given context.
Now, one may choose to favour an alternative
viewpoint of epistemic realism, which pur-
ports to offer objectively true propositions
about the real world; this is a matter of per-
sonal preference. But such a realist perspective
cannot by itself invalidate the relativist stance
of radical constructivism – it is an empty exer-
cise to find fault with relativism solely for not
being in conformity with realism..! It seems to
me that what is lacking in critical realism is a
way to demonstrate some objectively true
cognitive propositions about the outside
world. I cannot see that the arguments pre-
sented by Saalmann accomplish that. 
Gernot Saalmann applauds radical con-
structivism’s (§35) use of human constructs
“to understand the foreign,” but bemoans its
refusal to accept any additional claim that
these may “correspond with reality” (§§33,
34). The author seems to forget, unfortu-
nately, that the refusal was meant to solve a
problem – that of the absence of an observed
referent in social research. His plea for a
replacement by “critical realism” does not
deal with that problem, and thus falls flat.
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To re-specify the problem, I distinguish
three “worlds” that nicely characterise our
“understand[ing] of the foreign.” The first
world is that of daily life. Here we may navi-
gate or act in any way we want. We know what
“real” butter is or love; we recognise “things.”
We may step out into the second world, how-
ever – for example to add understanding to
the first, or knowledge, or to help increase our
ability to act effectively in daily life. 
We also may step into the third world.
This is the place of “isms.” It is where we
decide which concepts to import into the sec-
ond world – for example first world recogni-
tions of butter or love. Here we determine
whether to use this import (or data) as a ref-
erent to discover how the second world relates
to the first. This check is not part of the second
world, as researchers will operate only on
what is coming in and cannot decide which
inputs “correspond with reality” (§35).
The absence of this check is, I think, well
known to anyone sufficiently privileged to act
within the second world. He or she will search
for links among its input that satisfy the crite-
rion of closure, that is, whether data can be
identified given other data and vice versa (the
data involved constitute an autopoietic sys-
tem (§7, §17)). Such links are not based on the
authority of a church, a government or of any
“ism” in the third world.
As an example, consider how Kepler
moved beyond Tycho Brahe’s cosmological
model (in his Astronomia Nova written in
1609). Brahe agreed with Copernicus that the
sun was not a planet like Mars (although he
still assumed it turned around the earth), but
rejected his helio-centrism. He preferred to
equate the universe’s centre with the “average
sun,” the average of the (first world) positions
of the centre of the earth’s trajectory – rather
than with the sun.
Kepler did not like the way Brahe tried to
order the input from his first world. He con-
sidered the choice of the average too arbitrary.
Eventually he noticed that the link led to pre-
dictions that deviated 5 arcminutes from
what was observed. He was able to correct this
by replacing the average, the referent to
Brahe’s predictions, with data on the sun.
Later authors took this to show that the ability
to correct deviations requires increasingly
realistic models.
Unfortunately, this interpretation is
wrong as, firstly, Kepler could not assume his
data on the sun to “corresponded [more] with
reality” than his data on the planets. Both
were just imports from the first world. Sec-
ondly, he chose to link to the data on the sun
because of their usefulness in correcting the
deviations from Brahe’s model. Thirdly, his
new referent (the sun) forced him to replace
circles by ellipses – a notion he did not import
from his first world.
The example shows that some level of clo-
sure may occur even if one links to a construct
like a (non-observable) average (as in Brahe’s
model), and that the level of closure of a link
may be increased by a suitable choice of what
to link to. Neither depends on a correspon-
dence with reality, however. In a well-known
essay, the physicist Wigner (1960) recognised
this. He refers to closure as a miracle, a mys-
tery for which “we should be grateful.” 
This brings us back to the problem that, in
my reading, radical constructivism originally
tried to solve. What it did not attempt was to
summarise what active researchers all know –
that reality has no special role in the second
world. Its problem was that it had proved
incorrect to expect that closure in social
research could be facilitated, à la Kepler, by
the choice of an observable referent. Here, it is
necessary to construct the referent, i.e. revert
to Brahe’s approach.
An example is the growth of collectives as
autonomous entities that fit their environ-
ment (De Zeeuw 2001). Their referent has to
be a collective’s next stage of development,
which it (or its researchers) should construct
as a preferred stage, as in design research. As
this referent is not an input from the first
world, it does not support “critical realism” –
which appears limited to the study of what
“is” in the first world, for example participa-
tion in teamwork.
My comments above emphasise that
activities in the second world (that of
research) are not based on any “correspon-
dence with reality.” Any results that research-
ers achieve are a miracle that does not need
explanation. Alternatively, there is good rea-
son to explore how they come about. This is
where activities in the third world become
important, for example the development of
theories or philosophies of cognition (§4).
I agree with the author that radical con-
structivism still needs some work. Its advan-
tages are that it quite nicely identifies what
goes on in the second world and that it sup-
ports social design research. These are not
sufficient to accept it unconditionally, obvi-
ously. There is still space for alternatives –
even to the “left” of radical. Tymieniecka
argues in favour of “creative imagination” as a
referent to achieve closure in the development
of collectives (Mardas 2005).
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First Impression
One of the striking aspects of the com-
mentaries is that radical constructivists try to
evade confrontation. For example, they con-
cede that “only Glasersfeld consistently repre-
sents RC” (the Järvilehtos §1), which can be
interpreted such that dealing with other pro-
ponents isn’t worth the effort. A central point
for any constructivist theory – namely the
cogitating subject – is left to mysticism by
Glasersfeld (§14). For similar reasons the
famous ending of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is
evoked time and again (the Järvilehtos §2,
Reid §9). As if the logical positivism of the
early Wittgenstein could be convincing for a
critical realist! Furthermore they maintain
that the decision between epistemic relativ-
ism or epistemic realism is said to be a matter
of personal preference only (Quale §6, cf.
Maturana’s value statement cited in Bettoni
§2), which is the reason why realists and rad-
ical constructivists cannot understand each
other (Dykstra §13, Quale §9). So is there any
chance for a real discussion and understand-
ing?
Sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge
What happens if we observe how two sci-
entists exchange texts with one another? Do
we have to admit that they receive written
symbols that they have to interpret or may we
think these symbols only exist in the reality
constructions they have? Our observation of
the two scientists is in itself a construction,
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but this does not imply that they do not exist.
This would lead to an endless regression and
therefore, strictly, to nowhere. Isn’t it plausi-
ble then, to think that our construction of the
scientific exchange tells us something about
the persons, the symbols and the interpreta-
tions involved? Wouldn’t it be absurd to
believe that we could not at least in part grasp
the interpretations as they were really meant,
but are imprisoned in our own interpreta-
tions? This would render any discussion use-
less, which directly pertains to our present
discussion on RC.
Any debate on such basic epistemological
statements as realism, constructivism or RC is
connected to world views as a whole. About
these we cannot argue purely rationally – we
hold to them emotionally too (Dykstra §13,
Quale §6, and Reid §4 hint at this). As the
sociology of knowledge shows, a paradigm
shift bears resemblances to religious conver-
sion (Kuhn 1970). This surely does not occur
often in one’s life. Although a “conversion” or
“re-conversion” seems improbable then, we
can nevertheless try to further understand-
ing.
Thesis
All I tried to argue for in my paper was,
that (1) naïve realism or objectivism is inade-
quate and that we therefore should embrace a
critical realism (which is a variant of con-
structivism), as well as (2) that the radical step
to complete subjectivism or relativism (cf.
Quale §9), which means anti-realism, is (a)
not necessary, (b) not even plausible from the
existing arguments, and (c) useless.
To make the case for RC strong, I com-
bined the arguments from different traditions
or models so that they could support each
other, which on the other side was valid for
the counter-arguments as well. Many of the
commentators pointed to the fact that this
combination is not without problems (Bet-
toni, Glasersfeld, the Järvilehtos, Quale) but
none answered the argumentation in its
entirety. Instead different points have been
picked out. Some even used the occasion to
promote their own theory (Müller, de
Zeeuw) so that the discussion ignored the
original argument. 
It is remarkable how many argued in favor
of Glasersfeld and not of others. His school
seems tightly organized and his call to arms
has been successful. “Once more into…”
Antithesis
As the commentators touched on too
many points to answer them all, I have to
focus on some of the central concepts.
Radical. My use of the term radical is
questioned by Dykstra §§2 and 3 by reference
to the OED. However, we only have to consult
another dictionary to get different defini-
tions. So for example on www.websters-
online-dictionary.org, we can find the mean-
ing “far beyond the norm” in first place. 
Of course “to the roots” is one important
meaning of the term, but we should consider
that it is very often used in an ideological fash-
ion to disguise the fact that people propose
extreme conclusions from simple statements.
Indeed I maintain that RC draws radical con-
clusions in the sense of being too extreme. 
Reality. Cariani §2 points out that I do
not define my concept of realism. I object to
this criticism since I stated that I am interested
in a non-objectivist epistemology and this
should have made clear that I surely do not
embrace a naïve realism and objectivsm (cf.
§1 of my text). Nevertheless Cariani goes on
to build up objectivism as a counterposition,
as his second premise of realism reads “reality
is absolutely knowable” (§3). Only a naïve
realist would make such a claim. I also would
not deny the possibility of a realist version of
pragmatism (§3). A good case in point is Gla-
sersfeld’s example of the key that fits the lock
(Cariani §6): because it fits, the fit not only
describes a capacity of the key, but tells us
something about the lock as well. From our
experience we learn about reality, but never
gain absolute knowledge. What Cariani
describes in §7 as RC is identical to a critical
realist position if we simply omit the term
radical: “a (radical) constructivist can consis-
tently speak of an external world, and even its
hypothetical structure, without making any
claims that the posited structure is objectively
true.” But he can claim a certain reality for
them and to do this we do not need to be able
to compare our constructions to the “real
reality” – as the Järvilehtos §4 and Dykstra
§4 imply. But the Järvilehtos also state a posi-
tion that is fully compatible with critical real-
ism: “Cognition does not represent the world,
or deliver us pictures thereof, but rather
establishes a functional fit with the world. We
do not need pictures of the world…” (§7) and
pragmatism: “Whatever we construct…is not
a picture…but a particular way to act in the
world…” (§8). There is no argument given as
to why we are not entitled to claim a relation
between our constructions and reality. We do
not need to think that there is anything in
reality that objectively conforms to our con-
structions, but we can always build new
hypotheses and test them. If we succeed they
tell us something about reality – and, in con-
trast to Glasersfeld, I think we can and should
still speak of reality. 
I appreciate very much that von Glasers-
feld took the time to comment on my paper .
Unfortunately he does not seem to present
new arguments. He still cannot give an argu-
ment as to why it should not be possible to
gain “insights about obstacles from malfunc-
tions” (§17). Why shouldn’t our hypotheses
be interpreted to tell us something about real-
ity? How can Glasersfeld argue that “any
specification is necessarily in terms abstracted
from experience and therefore has no pur-
chase on reality”? How can he know this if we
cannot have knowledge from reality? To para-
phrase his words they only say: “If there is no
objectivity possible, you cannot be realist,”
which seems very narrow minded to me.
Whether we strictly confine ourselves to our
experiential reality in the end depends on the
plausibility of the arguments against a realist
position – and here we should be able to dis-
tinguish between a naïve and a critical real-
ism. 
Structured. I indeed think that all our con-
structed knowledge implies that reality is
mind-independently pre-structured (Müller
§4). The world is out there and for the present
epistemological discussion it is of no interest
how it came to be. So I cannot recognize any
metaphysical claim here, except for physical
existence. I go with the Järvilehtos §6 then,
that “we can deduce from experience that the
world – whatever it is – exhibits certain struc-
turality which limits our constructions of it.”
Connected with this is the next point:
“At random”. Making use of Donald
Davidson’s (1973) principle of charity (i.e.,
always to assume rationality and coherence in
the utterances of a speaker), I simply re-stated
in §13 what RC (in this case brain physiology)
does not say, just to make the argument of Roth
more evident. From this context it should be
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clear that it does not relate to a philosophical
argumentation for RC. So Bettoni §6, Glasers-
feld §§10 and 18 “not ‘fictitious’” or Dykstra
§10 describing knowledge as “some kind of
‘laissez-faire’ activity” all miss the point. 
Internal. Glasersfeld §7 holding that RC
is an operationalist theory, Quale’s discussion
of solpsism (§4) and Bettoni §4 stressing
mental operations all hint at the same point. I
agree that we can describe mental operations
without taking them to represent reality, but
there is no way to deny this possibility – just
because we cannot know. If one argues from
the perspective of phenomenalism one does
not need to deny matter and in fact could not
do so. But if one can make no statement on its
existence one cannot deny a relation of our
constructions to it as well. I cannot find any
plausible argument for this.
It is exactly because everything is a con-
struction that it seems highly unreasonable to
use one model only for the process of con-
struction – be this phenomenology, Spencer
Brown, cybernetics, autopoiesis or genetic
structuralism. The more so because they all
are very rationalistic and mechanistic which
seems inadequate for life and emotional
beings such as humans in particular. This lead
me to combine the arguments from different
models so that they could support each other.
But a closer look showed the gaps in the argu-
mentation. A good example for such a flaw is
given by Reid §8 where he states that “we find
ourselves observing the operational closure of
the cognitive systems we observe.” In which
way should we be able to observe the closure?
We only can infer it! 
Viability. To go on with life we do not
need objective certainty for our “knowledge”;
some pragmatic possibility is enough. Even if
we concede that all our inferences from prac-
tice are mere interpretations and construc-
tions, this does not tell anything about their
quality. But if we live on thanks to our con-
structions, are we not allowed to infer that
they are not too bad in the end? The only sup-
position that we have to make is that we exist
– and to doubt this is futile, as the history of
philosophy tells us.
For me it makes no sense to discuss the
viability of knowledge constructions with-
out their connection to the viability of the
organism, consisting of the brain and the
body. Only if we assume a realism can this
connection be explained. Our reality con-
structions are somehow related to reality.
This does not imply that knowledge is objec-
tively true (even if many claim this still), or
that we could ever test how far our subjective
constructions fit to the objectively existing
reality. That we (our brain, our conscience
and our identity construction) can make a
decision that enables us to survive proves the
relation of our knowledge constructions to
reality (but not that they mirror reality, to be
sure). 
Plausibility.  This concerns epistemolog-
ical conclusions against realism, not those in
favor of constructivism (after all I am con-
structivist, too). Glasersfeld §21 mentions
that the plausibility refers to the reality we
have constructed, not to any independent
reality (to my regret, in the text to which he
refers I can not find any argument dealing
with plausibility). I agree with this, but it
only means that the argumentations should
stand the test of logic, which is valid in both
worlds and irrespective of what kind of the-
ory we hold. Otherwise we could not argue
with one another. Bettoni §3 hints at coher-
ence to explain plausibility, which is quite
right. But he presupposes a certain concep-
tion of experiential reality which I find prob-
lematic, as argued above (cf. “Internal”, §14).
Even if we accept a social theory of coherence
there remain problems (cf. the discussion on
the theory of Habermas).
The point I argue for is made by Quale §6
against me: “I cannot prove that the outside
world exists, but I nevertheless choose to
assume it!” If this is “non-cognitive knowl-
edge,” RC is non-cognitive, too.
“What is plausible to one person is not
necessary plausible to another” (Quale §8) is
right, but what is academic discourse about
except plausibilities and the endeavor to
make things more plausible to others – espe-
cially if we are not naïve realists or cling to a
theory of objectivity?
Use. A statement or theory is of use when
it makes us to see things differently or “bet-
ter” than before. With respect to the radical-
ism of RC I do not see any use (Dykstra §11).
Considering future epistemological discus-
sion I would like to draw attention to the
point that we should not argue with respect
to ends and usefulness only (instrumental-
ism), but by reconsidering the whole range of
our actions and what these actions might tell
us about ourselves and the world (pragma-
tism). Looking back we see that many actions
do not have any definite end or purpose, e.g.,
social action or communication. The philos-
ophy of the 20th century has said a lot on this,
but RC seems almost never to refer to it (with
the exception of the Tractatus).
Synthesis
I argue for an epistemological position
between objectivism and radical relativism.
In variation of Müller §7 I hold that there is
a mind-independently structured reality as
well as a working-reality. All our actions con-
tribute to refine the working-reality so as to
seemingly match the mind-independent real-
ity ever better. The only criterion we have to
assess this is viability, but that is enough to be
realist – albeit a critical one.
In the end the “stubborn” critical realist
can respond to the “stubborn” radical con-
structivist:
1. Reality out there exists.
2. We can never know for sure whether our
reality constructs are true out there.
3. But this is not necessary. Even if they only
are true for us (and the “us” differs), we are
entitled to think that our reality con-
structs are related to reality, because we
experience that they work. Therefore we
can stick to a version of realism which is
critical with respect to our capacity as
knowing subjects. 
4. To claim the viability of constructs, with-
out the environment to live in, does not
lead to any knowledge that critical realism
does not already embrace.
5. If RC is not able to present better argu-
ments for its radicalism, it will have disap-
peared within a few years, whereas con-
structivism will live on.
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